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Abstract
Background: The department of defense’s FM 3-11 is among the military’s field manuals for preparing for, reacting
to and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. Since post 9-11, U.S. military service
members have been deployed in the global war on terrorism. This study attempted to determine the effectiveness
of the FM 3-11 in detecting, deterring or preventing a human-borne with bioagent (HBBA) terrorist breach at an
entry control point (ECP).
Method: This time-specific, cross-sectional study disseminated a validated survey tool with Cronbach’s α > 0.82 to
respondents who have had antiterrorism training and combat ECP experience. The return rate was greater than
75.0 %; however, many of the respondents failed to meet the inclusion criteria. Consequently, only 26
questionnaires were included in the sample.
Results: The results revealed that while over 60.0 % of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that
biointelligence, the deployment of biodetectors and the use of biowarning systems could be effective in
preventing an ECP breach by a terrorist with a bioagent, the use of protective equipment and immunization to
decontaminate service members or other TTPs would never prevent a breach. A large percentage of respondents
claimed that soldiers at the ECP lacked the devices or the knowledge to detect an HBBA at an ECP, and 72.0 %
suggested modifying current ECP TTPs to include education, training and equipment for security personnel at
military base ECPs.
Conclusion: If obtained from appropriate sources and communicated to the personnel at the ECP in an effective or
timely manner, the possible effectiveness of certain TTPs in the FM 3-11, specifically FM 3-11.86 (intelligence), might
increase.
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Background
The September 11, 2001 attack on the United States and
the anthrax incidents that same year are generally agreed
to have changed the global and U.S. response to terrorism;
as a result, the “nation’s bioterrorism response capability
has become an imminent priority for policymakers, re-
searchers, public health officials, academia and the private
sector” ([1], p.1). Previously, in 1984, a religious cult called
“Bagwan Shree Rajneesh” was reported to have contami-
nated a salad bar in the U.S. with Salmonella in the first
case of bioterrorism (BT). Other cases include the 1996
Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 contamination of muffins and
donuts in Dallas, Texas, and the 1997 and 1998 anthrax
hoaxes reported in Washington, DC, and Los Angeles, re-
spectively [2–4].
Other bioterrorist events, as reported by Tucker [5],
include the 1970 “Weather Underground” revolutionary
group attack on federal buildings; the 1972 college eco-
terrorist group, “R.I.S.E”, which employed eight micro-
bial pathogens, including typhoid fever, diphtheria,
dysentery and meningitis; the 1980 attack by the “Red
Army Fraction” group, a Marxist revolutionary ideo-
logical group; the deliberate contamination of salad bars
with Salmonella bacterium 1984 by a “Rajneeshee Cult”;
a in 1991 ricin threat made by the “Minnesota Patriots
Council” for personal revenge; and, in 1998, the arrest of
Larry Wayne Harris when he talked about obtaining and
deploying anthrax to achieve a “white supremacist goal”.
Dudley [6] reported that between 1990 and 2000, a total
of 1368 cases of tularemia, one of the recognized
diseases caused by a bioagent Francisella tularensis (a
biological agent), were reported in the U.S.
In March 2002 in Texas, the 12th cutaneous anthrax
case was detected and linked to mail in a Texas labora-
tory. In 2003, a total of nine ricin biothreats were re-
ported [7], while on February 3, 2004, the Dirksen
Senate Office Building in Washington, DC, was reported
to have discovered ricin in the office of Senator Bill Frist.
In April, 2013, letters that tested positive for ricin were
reportedly sent to Senator Roger Wicker [8], and similar
letters were also reportedly sent to the President of the
United States, Barack Obama, and the then-mayor of
New York City, Michael Bloomberg [9].
Field manuals, FM 3-11
The U.S. military has compiled and published many sets
of procedures as manuals for practically every operation
and for those employed in the field. These manuals in-
clude, but are not limited to, the Joint Entry Control Point
& Escalation of Force Procedures (JEEP) [10], the Joint
Forward Operations Base (JFOB) [11], the Unit Antiter-
rorism Officer (UAO) Handbook [12] and the Field Man-
ual (FM) 3-11 [13]. Of these manuals, the FM 3-11 series
is the most specific to biological agent preparation and
reactions; thus, it is a focus for critique in this study. This
multi-service tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP)
manual focus on chemical, biological, radiological and nu-
clear (CBRN) agents. There are approximately six different
subclasses of this manual, numbered 3-11, 3-11.3; 3-11.4;
3-11.5; 3-11.86 and 3-11.9 [13–18]. In summary, FM 3-11
covers the military’s strategies and policy on CBRN; FM 3-
11.3, updated in 2009, addresses steps for avoiding CBRN
agents; FM 3-11.4 addresses protective wear and measures
and was updated in 2009. FM 3-11.5 details decontamin-
ation procedures, FM 3-11.86 emphasizes the roles of bio-
logical surveillance, and FM 3.11-9 provides a detailed
reference for the biological and chemical agents employed
for CB warfare [13–18]. While these TTPs are very useful,
they are not specific enough for easy application at the
entry control point (ECP).
The U.S. military is one of the major resources the
government employs for national security [19] and the
global war on terrorism; consequently, service members
(SMs) are exposed to the possibility of a bioagent attack.
This exposure was anticipated during the invasion of
Iraq in 1990 and 2003, when SMs were given mandatory
antibiotics [20]. The exact number of military bases in
foreign location is ever-changing because of the dynam-
ics of the nation’s anti-terrorism strategy; however, the
Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2010 report indicates
that there were 662 facilities maintained by the U.S.
military in 38 foreign countries, excluding those in Iraq
and Afghanistan [21].
Totten [22] reported that returning U.S. military
personnel, like international travelers, immigrants, or
imported goods, are viewed even by intelligence agencies
as sources for the introduction of contagious infectious
diseases into the U.S. As multi-national forces engage in
joint missions in regional and global attempts to address
conflicts or humanitarian crises, questions are arising
about the possible roles the military may play in dissem-
inating diseases in the countries where they are deployed
or in the acquisition of diseases from fellow soldiers
from other nations during joint deployments [23, 24].
Aerssens’ 2011 study [23] reported the Belgian troops’
return from Congo with parasite infections.
Many studies have been conducted by the military in
the U.S. and other countries to understand the role and
impact of infectious disease dissemination among de-
ployed personnel in terms of disease surveillance, [25–27],
but at present, no study has addressed the breach of an
ECP with the intent to cause bioterrorism (BT) against
U.S. military personnel that would impact their health and
mission.
On September 16, 2014, United States President
Barack Obama announced to the nation his strategy and
actions to combat the Ebola outbreak in some countries
in the West African countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone
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and Guinea, with a promise to deploy U.S. military
service members [28]. Immediately, questions from
members of press reflected fears about the possibilities
of these military men and women becoming infected
with the virus and becoming “vectors” of transmission
back to the USA.
While at this time, there is no documented evidence
of an HBBA terrorist attack against a U.S. military com-
bat, numerous cases of possible “potential vulnerabil-
ities” have been reported by Hylton [29], and more have
been reported by Alakpa [30]. The lack of such an attack
does not rule out the future use of such an insidiously
deadly form of terrorism to threaten the U.S. security
and its forces stationed abroad. Should a terrorist group
attempt this route of attack, what measures are in place
to check or prevent a breach of an FOB’s ECP?
The purpose of this study was to determine whether
the current DoD FM 3-11 field manual series, which is
specifically designed to prepare for and respond to a
biological agent attack, would be effective for detecting,




The target populations selected for this pretest were U.S.
military personnel (primarily) and other individuals in
the security profession (secondarily) with combat experi-
ence. A total of 110 questionnaires were distributed, in-
cluding single copies given to the 13 points of contact
(POCs) for willing respondents at eight military installa-
tions: a National Guard post, three police stations in
Sussex County, NJ, the Veteran’s Administration (VA)
Security Post at Castle Point, NY, two military/veteran
coordinators at NJ Universities, and the U.S. Customs
and Borders Office in Newark, NJ.
Research design
This was a cross-sectional survey study with the admin-
istration of a validated, five-point Likert-scaled question-
naire with two constructs and Cronbach’s alpha
reliabilities of 0.820 and 0.892 for Constructs 1 and 2,
respectively [30]. The questionnaire was distributed to
respondents in the selected organizations, and a single-
blind approach was used to ensure that no direct contact
occurred between the respondents and investigator.
However, in some situations, there was direct contact
between prospective respondents (those willing to par-
ticipate) and the investigator, who later offered these re-
spondents hard copies of the questionnaires, along with
consent forms. Electronic copies were also sent to re-
spondents who requested the questionnaire and consent
forms in an electronic format.
Data collection
Data from the target population was collected with the
validated survey tool. Only those questionnaires that
were fully completed or had no more than four missing
items and in which the respondents demonstrated
knowledge or training on antiterrorism ECP TTPs were
accepted for analysis.
Data analysis
Data collected were analyzed using the Statistical Prod-
uct and Service Solution (SPSS) statistical software (Base
Grad Pack shrink wrap version 21.0) for both descriptive
and scale reliability—Cronbach’s alpha analysis.
Delimitations of study
This research study focused primarily on military com-
bat settings. The respondents were primarily military or
involved in national security and had personal know-
ledge of and/or training in antiterrorism (AT) measures
and TTPs. It did not reveal or expose details about clas-
sified military TTPs, analyze or review specifics of the
military TTPs that focus on reaction and recovery from
terrorist attacks on combat bases, or reveal exact names
of combat bases and their coordinates or the specifics of
their activities. The study was limited to the periods wit-
nessed by one of the investigators while on tour of duty
in Afghanistan as a force protection vulnerability asses-
sor for the U.S. Army Central Command.
Ethical statement/approval
The New Jersey City University IRB approved this re-
search on 05/13/2014 as part of the corresponding au-
thor’s DSc dissertation. The respondents’ privacy was
protected and no identifying personal information was
collected.
Results
Only questionnaires that were at least 95.0 % complete
and respondents who demonstrated personal knowledge
of or training in any anti-terrorism (AT) tactics, tech-
niques and procedures (TTP) were included in the ana-
lyses. The return rate from those who were willing to
participate and signed the consent form was 75.0 %.
After eliminating those who did not fit the required cri-
teria, 26 questionnaires that could be subjected to ana-
lysis remained.
Limitations of results
During the dissemination of the survey tool (question-
naire) to the target population, many in the military or
Custom and Border Control/Immigration Service agents
showed reluctance to participate or permit their subordi-
nates to participate. This reluctance ultimately affected
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the response rate, the number of respondents, and even-
tually the sample size of this pretest study.
This small sample size made it impossible for the re-
searchers to make a broad generalization or inference
from the findings of the study. However, it is important
to emphasize that the results tend to show that the ECPs
of combat FOBs are vulnerable to breach by a terrorist
carrying biological agents. Additionally, these percep-
tions come from people who have generally been re-
cently deployed and have ECP TTP experiences in a
combat environment. Field experience is an important
factor in these positions, as individuals who have not
been deployed lack the necessary readiness. Over 92 %
of the respondents in this study whose questionnaires
were completed, returned and analyzed were combat
veterans with a minimum of two tours of deployment
and with ECP TTP personal experience.
Descriptive data of respondents
More than eighty percent (80.8 %) of respondents whose
questionnaires were selected and analyzed were in the
military; 15.4 % were retired military, and 3.8 % were
from Homeland Security. In terms of military service
branch, 80.0 % were in the U.S. Army, 12.0 % were in
the U.S. Air Force, 4.0 % were in the U.S. Navy, and
4.0 % were U.S. Marines. Of this sample, 69.2 % were en-
listed, 26.9 % were officers, and 3.8 % were civilians.
Combat experience of the respondents
More than ninety-two percent (92.3 %) of the respon-
dents had been deployed to combat zones, with 75.0 %
just returning from the Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) campaign in Afghanistan; 16.7 % were in the Iraq
war, and 8.3 % were involved in Operation New Dawn.
All of the respondents claimed to have had personal
knowledge of or training in anti-terrorism.
Respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of CBRN TTP
Slightly more than forty-six percent (46.1 %) of respon-
dents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the notion
that immunizing every resident of a combat post will as-
sist in the detection of a terrorist with a BA at the ECP.
Additionally, 53.8 % strongly disagreed or disagreed that
immunization would prevent the breach of a combat
ECP by a terrorist with a BA (Fig. 1).
Biosurveillance TTP as detailed in FM 3-11.86
Slightly more than eighty percent (80.7 %) of the respon-
dents agreed or strongly agreed that biological
intelligence would facilitate the effective identification of
a terrorist with a bioagent at the ECP. More than
seventy-six percent (76.9 %) agreed or strongly agreed
that the deployment of biological agent collectors or de-
tectors in the area of operation (AO) would prevent an
ECP breach by a terrorist with a bioagent. Finally, 61.5 %
agreed or strongly agreed that a biological warfare attack
warning system would prevent the breach of an ECP by
an HBBA terrorist (Fig. 2).
Protective equipment and the breaching of ECPs by an
HBBA terrorist (FM 3-11.4)
The responses regarding how effective the current
CBRN TTP (FM 3-11.4) would be in the detection, de-
terrence or mitigation of a successful breach of the ECP
by an HBBA terrorist were analyzed. Approximately
fifty-five percent (53.8 %) of the respondents strongly
disagreed or disagreed with the notion that current indi-
vidual protective equipment would prevent the breach of
a combat ECP by a terrorist carrying a bioagent. Fifty-
seven percent (57.6 %) strongly disagreed or disagreed
with the statement that wearing protective gear would
prevent the breach of a combat ECP by a terrorist carry-
ing a bioagent (Fig. 3).
Respondents suggestion for the modification of current
FOB ECP TTPs
In response to the item asking whether there is a need
for any modification of current ECP TTPs to enhance
security against a human terrorist with a BA at an ECP,
72.0 % of the respondents responded “yes”. Over 70.0 %
of those who answered “yes” recommended the need for
training and education on bioagents and bioterrorism
for every personnel manning the ECP. Over 60.0 % rec-
ommended that in addition to training, effective equip-
ment for bioagent detection should be provided for
personnel at the ECP.
Responses regarding BA devices at ECPs
Fifty percent of the respondents strongly disagreed or
disagreed with the statement that soldiers at the ECP
had devices, such as the explosive trace detector spray
Fig. 1 The respondents’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of immunization protocols against a BA breach at an ECP
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kits employed for improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
that could effectively detect traces of BAs on a person at
the ECP. Similarly, 53.8 % either strongly disagreed or
disagreed that every soldier at the ECP is adequately
knowledgeable about how to look for BAs or what to
look for.
Discussion
This preresult indicated that 61.5 % of the respondents,
the majority of whom were combat veterans, think it is
either possible or very possible for a terrorist carrying a
biological agent to successfully breach a combat ECP un-
detected. The fact that the analysis indicated that over
60.0 % of the respondents either agreed or strongly
agreed that biological intelligence, the deployment of
biological collectors or detectors and biowarning signals
would be effective in preventing the breach of a combat
ECP by an HBBA terrorist tends to indicate limited
knowledge. These policies or practices are more reactive
in nature, as they are deployed in response to the de-
tected presence of a released bioagent in line with the
U.S. military and government; hence the 2002 National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
(CWMD) [31, 32]. The federal government has deployed
biodetectors around certain areas on civil security bases
under the “BioWatch” program, as documented in Cha-
pa’s [33] article. Regarding the use of personal protective
equipment (PPE) and immunization as currently prac-
ticed under the CBRN TTPs, over 50 % and 45 % of re-
spondents, respectively, strongly disagreed or disagreed
that these methods would effectively prevent an HBBA
terrorist from breaching an ECP. Usually, PPEs are
donned after intelligence has indicated a possible threat,
generally in war theater and not necessarily at the ECP,
while immunization is performed to prevent infections
based on the threat of a specific agent that intelligence
has identified.
It is striking to note that the respondents claimed that
soldiers are not educated regarding searching for BAs at
the ECP, nor are they equipped with the necessary de-
vices to detect a BA on a person or a vehicle, such as
the equipment employed for IED searches. While the au-
thors acknowledge the limitations of this study, the per-
ceptions of these respondents remain very authentic
because they have firsthand combat ECP TTP experi-
ences. During this study, many of the respondents sug-
gested the need for authorities to educate soldiers about
bioterrorism and HBBA terrorists and the need for
changes in current ECP TTPs to include procedures that
involve searching for BAs.
The authors also acknowledges the difficulties that
might arise with the development of devices that will ef-
fectively detect all BAs; however, the current situation of
a complete absence of any BA-deterrent search practices
and the use of obsolete biowarfare TTPs, as enumerated
in the current FM 3-11 series, is troubling. The success-
ful importation of the Ebola virus into Nigeria and the
U.S.A. by individuals who knew they had had contact
with people infected with the Ebola hemorrhagic virus
remains the most parallel case and the best practical ex-
ample of a human-borne with bioagent (HBBA), a hu-
man mobile bioagent device. Those individuals knew
that they were infected, yet lied to the officials at the
ECP to enter their intended countries. Those events tend
to confirm the feasibility and possibility of an intentional
and deliberate transportation of an infectious agent in-
Fig. 2 The respondents’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of biointelligence protocols against a BA breach at an ECP
Fig. 3 The respondent’s perceptions regarding the effectiveness of personal protective equipment protocols against a BA breach at an ECP
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borne by humans across borders to cause or spread dis-
ease in another country. Mr. Patrick Sawyer was actively
incubating a deadly virus in an implanted IED, which is
known as a surgically inserted improvised explosive
device (SIIED) in military parlance; thus, he was a
“human-time-bomb,” an HBBA who left his country
undetected by a point of exit/entry (POE) security metal
detector search, flew into Nigeria, and passed through
metal detectors and other POE security searches that
failed to detect or identify the virus he was carrying.
Similarly, Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan cared for a family/
people who actively exhibited EVD symptoms and who
later died. He lied to officials at the Liberian airport
about his prior contact to board an airplane ultimately
headed for the U.S., where as many as 100 individual
were placed at risk of possible infection [34, 35]. The
Liberian president was reportedly unhappy with Mr.
Duncan’s behavior and stated his willingness to pros-
ecute the index case when or if Mr. Duncan returns to
Liberia [36].
There are no longer any illusions regarding the possi-
bility and feasibility of humans becoming carriers of bio-
logical agents, and there are no illusions regarding the
actions of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, who are
actively seeking the means to acquire and transport BAs
through the U.S./Mexico border with the intention of
causing terror against the United States [37, 38]. Fur-
thermore, the U.S. has numerous military bases on for-
eign lands, and military personnel can acquire microbial
infections during deployment that can be transported to
the homeland [22–24]. We cannot wait for another 9-11
attack before accepting that this form of terrorism is
feasible, as the enemy has proven to be always to be one
step ahead. Now is the time for civil security/national se-
curity personnel and leaders to break this circle. It would
be a mistake to confuse biowarfare with bioterrorism;
the former requires sophisticated equipment that it is
not very necessary in the latter, especially when there are
willing volunteers seeking martyrdom.
Significance of study
A successful breach of a U.S. military combat post by
a bioterrorist would not only have a devastating effect
on morale, it would affect the military’s fighting
strength and thus its missions. It would provide an
additional route of BA dissemination to the U.S.
mainland. The failure to detect a BA during its incu-
bation period would result in a failure to treat in-
fected soldiers (thus making them carriers of the BA),
especially those returning home for rest and recuper-
ation (R & R) and those redeploying home. This
study was the first to investigate the possible vulner-
ability of combat FOBs to a breach at the ECP by an
HBBA terrorist under current military measures.
Limitations of the study
This study employed a time-specific, cross-sectional de-
sign for the purpose of determining perceptions that are
critical to ECP security at a combat post by those who
are charged to ensure it. The restrictions placed on the
target respondent organizations’ populations, the classi-
fication limitations placed on military TTPs, and pos-
sible effects on the participants’ responses to the
questionnaire are other limitations.
Conclusion
If obtained from proper sources and communicated to
the personnel at the ECP in an effective or timely man-
ner, the effectiveness of certain TTPs outlined in the FM
3-11 - specifically FM 3-11.86, intelligence - might in-
crease. The fact remains that while there are drills on
soldiers’ reactions to a biological attack, there is no spe-
cific training for the ECP, such as how to search for bio-
logical agent in or on a person at the ECP. This explains
how the retired air force colonel described by Hylton
(29) was able to get a modified anthrax bacillus into the
White House and how an Afghani worker was able to
enter an FOB and serve food to soldiers despite having
an infectious skin problem. At ECPs, therefore, the
current FM 3-11 methods would be very ineffective for
preventing an HBBA breach.
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